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BETWEEN HERE AND 
THERE IS BETTER THAN 
ANYTHING OVER THERE:  
THE MORASS OF SAUVÉ  
V. CANADA (CHIEF 
ELECTORAL OFFICER) 
Richard Haigh* 
In 1993, the Supreme Court of Canada was asked to decide on the 
constitutional legitimacy of legislation prohibiting all prisoners from voting in 
federal elections.1 Given that the case ended up in our highest court, the parties 
must have considered it a fairly thorny problem to resolve. Apparently they 
were mistaken. In a mere 95 words, fewer than the average grade two writing 
assignment, the Court pronounced that the solution should have been obvious. 
Here is the judgment in its entirety: 
We are all of the view that these appeals should be dismissed.  
The Attorney General of Canada has properly conceded that s. 51(e) of the Canada 
Elections Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. E-2, contravenes s. 3 of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms but submits that s. 51(e) is saved under s. 1 of the Charter. 
We do not agree. In our view, s. 51(e) is drawn too broadly and fails to meet the 
proportionality test, particularly the minimal impairment component of the test, as 
expressed in the s. 1 jurisprudence of the Court.2 
Cut to 2002, almost 10 years later, and the Court is faced with virtually the 
same problem. This time, however, the legislation has been tinkered with. 
                                                                                                                                                              
* Visiting Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School and Director of Programs, Osgoode Profes-
sional Development Program. Thanks to Jonathan Hood for helping out with some of the research 
for this paper, Michael Sobkin, Steve Haigh and Charlotte Davis for their excellent critical com-
ments and suggestions. The title comes from a line in “Conduit for Sale” by Pavement. 
1
  Sauvé v. Canada (Attorney General), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 438 [hereinafter “Sauvé (No. 1)”]. 
2
  Id. 
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Instead of applying to all prisoners, the new legislative provision denies the 
right to vote in federal elections only for prisoners serving sentences of two 
years or greater. The federal government maintains that the new version is 
valid. Again, it is Richard Sauvé who is the lead challenger. 
The case is indexed as Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer).3 I imagine 
someone like Stephen Spielberg calling it The Neverending Return of Sauvé. 
Just like the plot in a movie sequel, the decision has mushroomed into 
something much more cumbersome and less likely to entertain. Two lengthy 
judgments, split 5-4, highlight the complexity. The Chief Justice, speaking on 
behalf of Arbour, Binnie, Iacobucci, and LeBel JJ., found the legislation 
remained unconstitutional. Justice Gonthier, carrying Bastarache, L’Heureux-
Dubé, and Major JJ., thought it was now a reasonable limit and so saved by 
section 1 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.4  
Sauvé (No. 2) provides an excellent example of how judgments are as much 
essays about our time as they are legal decisions.5 Rather than concentrating on 
a critical diagnosis of the judgments, this paper, in the manner of Marshall 
McLuhan’s “probes,” instead makes a number of observations about the case: 
the growing rift amongst Court members that is played out both linguistically 
and rhetorically; the dialogue metaphor in a new guise; public opinion and 
media representation of the Court; the growing moral and ethical relativism of 
section 1 analysis; and finally, a look at broader questions about voting and the 
nature of rights-based litigation. Framing these discussions and providing a 
counterpoint to the gravitas of the Supreme Court decision are short excerpts 
from the Special Committee on Electoral Reform that was given the task in 
1992 to deal with a number of electoral issues, including whether prisoners 
should have voting rights.  
I.  SAUVÉ REDUX 
Mr. Andre: I don’t see how I could prevail on my kids to take their vote responsibly 
when we feel that anybody can vote. That someone could be imprisoned for torture 
and that person’s vote is just as important as the vote of a responsible citizen, I just 
don’t accept that view. I think the vote is very important and that we should be a 
                                                                                                                                                              
3
  Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer) [2002] S.C.J. No. 66. [hereinafter “Sauvé (No. 
2)”]. 
4
  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter the “Charter”]. 
5
  There have already been articles that critically dissect the case and to which I could add 
little — see e.g., Weinrib, “The Charter’s First Twenty Years: Assessing the Impact and Anticipat-
ing the Future,” presented at the 2002 Isaac Pitblado Lectures, Winnipeg, November 2002. Copy on 
file with author.  
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little more selective, if you will. I find it incredible that such is our feeling about 
the act they have committed that we would throw them into prison, but yet say that 
we don’t want to deny them the right to vote. That, to me, just isn’t common 
sense.6 
Sauvé (No. 2) began in 1996 at the Federal Court.7 Parliament had responded 
to the ruling in Sauvé (No. 1) by enacting a new section 51(e) to the Canada 
Elections Act,8 which denied the right to vote only to those inmates serving 
federal sentences of two years or more. At the trial, Wetston J., held that 
section 51(e) violated the Charter guarantee of the right to vote without being 
demonstrably justified, and was therefore void. In working through the section 
1 analysis, he was persuaded that the government’s objectives were pressing 
and substantial, but concluded that the legislation was overbroad and failed the 
minimal impairment test. Furthermore, he found that the legislation was 
disproportionate, as the negative consequences of the challenged provision 
outweighed any benefits it might have.9 On appeal to the Federal Court of 
Appeal, Linden J.A., speaking for the majority, reversed the trial judge and 
upheld the denial of voting rights.10 He found that Parliament’s role in 
maintaining and enhancing the integrity of the electoral process and in 
exercising the criminal law power warranted deference. Denying prisoners the 
right to vote in appropriate circumstances fell within a reasonable range of 
alternatives open to Parliament and was not overbroad or disproportionate. Like 
Wetston J., Desjardins J.A. in dissent emphasized the absence of evidence of 
benefits flowing from the denial and would not have saved the legislation under 
section 1 of the Charter. The dissenting judgment paved the way for the return 
of Sauvé to the Supreme Court. 
The bulk of both McLachlin C.J.’s majority and Gonthier J.’s minority 
judgments is centred on section 1 of the Charter. The government conceded that 
section 3 of the Charter — “every citizen has the right to vote in both federal 
and provincial elections and is qualified for membership therein” — is 
breached by the Act. The Court also dealt with a claim that the Act was 
contrary to section 15 of the Charter but the majority declined to address this 
aspect, given their finding that section 3 was breached.11 
                                                                                                                                                              
6
  Special Committee on Electoral Reform, March 15, 1993. 
7
  [1996] 1 F.C. 857, 106 F.T.R. 241, 132 D.L.R. (4th) 136 (T.D.). 
8
  S.C. 1993, c. 19, s. 23. It is now found in substantially the same form at s. 4(c) of the Can-
ada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c. 9 (the “Act”). In fact, the amendments to the Act came prior to the 
S.C.C.’s decision in Sauvé (No. 1) but after the Ontario Court of Appeal decision in that case. 
9
  [1996] 1 F.C. 857 (T.D.). 
10
  [2000] 2 F.C. 117 (C.A.). 
11
  Although the minority did spend some time on this aspect of the case, it will not form part 
of the discussion of this paper. 
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Both judgments agree that the government bears the burden of proving a 
valid objective and showing that the rights violation is warranted. They also 
reiterate the basic framework of the Oakes analysis: that legislation must be 
rationally connected, cause minimal impairment, and be proportionate to the 
benefit achieved.12  
After this, the two judgments diverge. The first point of contention between 
the majority and minority arises over the classification of the section 3 right. 
The majority determines that the right to vote contained in section 3 is 
fundamental to Canadian democracy and the rule of law. It is a “cornerstone” 
of democracy. Moreover, because section 3 is not subject to the section 33 
override, these rights are different, and cannot be lightly set aside. Just because 
the matter is one of “social and political philosophy” as was argued by the 
Crown, does not lessen the burden or give government added deference. The 
government must justify its position by logic and common sense (apparently a 
different common sense from that of Mr. Harvey Andre). 
The minority, in contrast, views the majority as creating a new justificatory 
standard, to be applied whenever a right in question is exempted from the 
section 33 override. For them, the override section was never intended to carry 
such weight or alter the scope of section 1. The majority standard is 
problematic because it tends to permit only one plausible social or political 
philosophy. Instead, the minority uses a different textual analysis to reach the 
opposite effect: since section 3 rights are internally limited — it is only 
“citizens” who are guaranteed these rights, in contrast to other fundamental 
freedoms and the legal and equality rights — the right cannot be seen as being 
somehow more fundamental or different in quality from other rights. Having 
established this, the minority relies on existing section 1 jurisprudence where 
the Court has given Parliament a margin of appreciation in regard to legitimate 
objectives which may, nonetheless, be based upon somewhat inconclusive 
social science evidence.  
Chief Justice McLachlin does not accept the argument that Parliament can 
breach fundamental values by picking and choosing from a range of acceptable 
alternatives. Although deference to Parliament may be allowed in certain 
situations where competing social and political policies prevail, it is not 
normally appropriate where limits are placed on fundamental rights. This is one 
of those cases. The majority’s view hearkens back to the language of Dickson 
C.J. in the great Charter cases of old where the Court was seen as the guardian 
                                                                                                                                                              
12
  R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103. 
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of our rights: “courts must be vigilant in fulfilling their constitutional duty to 
protect the integrity of this system.”13 
There is deep disagreement between the majority and the minority over the 
content for the requirements of a section 1 response. The majority holds that 
government justification must reasonably convince, but is not required to be 
scientifically proven. It can even include common sense and inferential 
reasoning as long as these are not based on stereotypes or do not substitute 
deference for reasoned demonstration. For the minority, the very nature of an 
issue that is sociopolitical makes the approach to the section 1 inquiry different. 
In such cases, judges should see that there are different social or political 
philosophies upon which justifications for or against the limitations of rights 
may be based. Approving or preferring one solution does not necessarily 
disprove the other, nor does it mean that another solution is outside the Charter 
requirements. To Gonthier J., where the social or political philosophy advanced 
by Parliament reasonably justifies a limitation of a Charter right, it should be 
upheld as constitutional.14 
Justice Gonthier relies on some of the early Charter jurisprudence of 
Dickson C.J. which held that formalistic approaches to the application of 
section 1 must be avoided. Section 1 is a gauge, sensitive to the values and 
circumstances particular to an appeal, that should vary depending on the 
circumstances of the case and the nature of the interests at stake. This means 
that factual, social, historical, and political context are all part of an essential 
backdrop to proper analysis of what is at stake in the case of an alleged 
infringement of a right. Justice Gonthier also notes that the purpose of section 1 
is to balance individual rights and communal values. To do so, courts must be 
sensitive to the competing rights and values that exist in our democracy. The 
minority does not accept the majority’s view that symbolism and philosophy 
are not relevant principles on which Parliament can order society. It contends 
that McLachlin C.J.’s ideas are equally vague and abstruse, but then accepts 
that it is impossible for anyone’s ideas not to be so when one looks at the 
“meaning” of the right to vote in a democracy. Since there is no way to assess 
the effectiveness of legislative enactments such as that contained in section 
51(e) of the Act, symbolic and abstract arguments are really the only thing that 
the Court can go on. The minority relies on a passage from Harvey v. New 
Brunswick (Attorney General)15 quoted by Linden J.A. at the appeal, where on 
                                                                                                                                                              
13
  Sauvé (No. 2), supra, note 3, at para. 15. Recall Dickson C.J. in Hunter v. Southam Inc., 
[1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 that under the Charter judiciaries are the “guardians of the constitution” and 
shall zealously protect individual rights and freedoms at the same time as constraining governmen-
tal action. 
14
  Id., at para. 67. 
15
  [1996] 2 S.C.R. 876. 
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behalf of the majority La Forest J. upheld similarly abstract objectives, noting 
that:  
the primary goal of the impugned legislation is to maintain and enhance the 
integrity of the electoral process … [S]uch an objective is always of pressing and 
substantial concern in any society that purports to operate in accordance with the 
tenets of a free and democratic society.16 
After the introductions to the Oakes analysis (Gonthier J.’s pre-Oakes 
remarks take up 69 paragraphs!), the decisions proceed through the Oakes test. 
For the majority, the legislation fails the test due to a lack of proportionality. 
There is no rational connection between denying the vote to penitentiary 
inmates and the goals of the legislation.  
Even at the first stage of the Oakes inquiry, however, the majority has 
difficulty accepting the government’s position. There is a high degree of 
condemnation for the objective:  
At the end of the day, people should not be left guessing about why their Char-
ter rights have been infringed. Demonstrable justification requires that the objective 
clearly reveal the harm that the government hopes to remedy, and that this objective 
remain constant throughout the justification process.17 
Moreover, McLachlin C.J. takes issue with the fact that Parliament did not 
disclose why additional punishment was required for these serious offences, or 
what additional objectives they hoped to achieve that they did not get out of an 
imprisonment already imposed. In the end, as in virtually all section 1 cases, 
the government is given the benefit of the doubt and the analysis proceeds to 
the second stage of the Oakes analysis. 
Contrast this with the approach of the minority towards the legislative 
objective. In Gonthier J.’s view, the government should not have been 
chastized at the initial stage of the Oakes test. As he concludes, “there was no 
error made by the courts below in identifying the objectives and in determining 
them to be pressing and substantial. I think that the importance of both 
objectives is obvious.”18 
At the second, rational connection stage of the inquiry, the government 
provides three reasons why restricting voting rights for certain prisoners is a 
reasonable limit on the right to vote: it educates inmates by showing them that 
obeying the law gives us certain rights; it maintains the integrity of the political 
system; and it acts as a legitimate form of punishment. Again, the majority and 
minority are at loggerheads.  
                                                                                                                                                              
16
  Id., at para. 38. 
17
  Sauvé (No. 2), supra, note 3, at para. 23.  
18
  Id., at para. 148. 
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The majority takes the position that any educational message obtained by 
denying the vote is more likely to be one that will increase criminals’ contempt 
for the law, not teach them to respect the law. Law’s legitimacy, via Rousseau’s 
social contract, is found partially in the right of citizens to vote. Denying 
prisoners the right to vote removes an important means of teaching them core 
democratic values including the idea of social responsibility. Moreover, the 
argument that disenfranchisement is educative loses some of its punch when the 
prohibition on voting applies to an extremely diverse group such as all 
prisoners incarcerated for two years or more.19  
To the minority, the temporary disenfranchisement of serious criminal 
offenders educates both prisoners and society — it reiterates society’s 
commitment to basic moral values. To allow serious offenders to vote would 
undermine the rule of law and civic responsibility because when people commit 
crimes they indicate to the public that they have no respect for the community. 
In Gonthier J.’s words:  
[s]ociety therefore may choose to curtail temporarily the availability of the vote to 
serious criminals both to punish those criminals and to insist that civic 
responsibility and respect for the rule of law…are prerequisites to democratic 
participation.20 
The majority argues that the trend in the history of Western democracies has 
been towards universal enfranchisement and away from discrimination. Section 
51(e) of the Act, in contrast, is a step backwards.21  
To the minority, however, the process of universalizing the franchise has 
little to do with the provision in question here. Past exclusions were 
discriminatory but section 51(e) distinguishes persons only on the basis that 
they have committed criminal acts. In Gonthier J.’s words, “‘[r]esponsible 
citizenship’ does not relate to what gender, race, or religion a person belongs 
to, but is logically related to whether or not a person engages in serious 
criminal activity.”22 Disenfranchisement for prisoners does not target specific 
groups and it is a temporary measure aimed at meeting penal goals.  
The second Crown argument is that denying prisoners the vote enhances 
respect for law; in other words, giving people who flout the law a right to vote 
demeans the political system. The majority also makes short shrift of this 
argument. As it is now a constitutionalized right, voting is not simply a 
privilege the government can suspend at will. Moreover, the argument 
reiterates the view that certain classes of people are not morally fit to vote, 
                                                                                                                                                              
19
  Id., at para. 39. 
20
  Id., at para. 116.  
21
  Id., at paras. 33-4. 
22
  Id., at para. 70 (emphasis in original). 
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which is unacceptable.23 The minority does not accept that this 
disenfranchisement affects a person’s dignity. Justice Gonthier has difficulty 
understanding how the debate can even be linked to dignity and stereotyping: 
for him it is the criminal act and punishment that is condemned, pure and 
simple. The Criminal Code24 protects certain Canadian values, and ensuring 
those who breach them are punished, in a range of reasonable ways, is neither 
stereotyping nor an affront to dignity.25 
The final Crown argument under the rational connection component is that 
disenfranchisement is nothing more than an extension of punishment. The 
majority of the Court rejects this argument on two grounds: denying 
constitutional rights as a form of punishment is suspect practice, and it does not 
comply with the requirements for legitimate punishment established by 
Canadian jurisprudence. The Chief Justice refers to this as an attempt by the 
government to craft a new tool of punishment, calling it “denial of 
constitutional rights.”26 By applying it to certain people, Parliament effectively 
removes them from Charter protection. For the majority it is no different from 
taking away a prisoner’s right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment or the 
right to free expression, neither of which are allowed. Failure to obey laws does 
not nullify a person’s membership in society — otherwise convicted criminals 
could be exiled or not allowed to remain part of our citizenry. The fact that 
other Charter provisions are in place to ensure that criminals are treated as 
persons with rights (such as sections 11 and 12) further indicates the need to 
protect as many of the basic rights as are appropriate.27 The other part of the 
argument that the majority relies on is that it is a fundamental principle of 
punishment that it must not be arbitrary, and must be tailored to the acts and 
circumstances of the individual. Disenfranchisement for all prisoners with two-
year sentences or longer does not meet these conditions. It neither reflects the 
individual moral culpability of offenders nor sends them an appropriate 
message.28 Chief Justice McLachlin summarizes the majority’s view that there 
is no rational connection between the government’s objective and section 51(e) 
of the Act: 
the right to punish and to denounce, however important, is constitutionally 
constrained. It cannot be used to write entire rights out of the Constitution, it cannot 
                                                                                                                                                              
23
  Id., at paras. 42-3. 
24
  R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
25
  Sauvé (No. 2), [2002] S.C.J. No. 66, at paras. 73-5. 
26
  Id., at para. 46. 
27
  Id., at para. 47. 
28
  Id., at para. 48. 
(2003), 20 S.C.L.R. (2d) Between Here and There 361 
 
 
Job name: SCLR vol 20     CRA           Date:Tuesday, March 06, 2012 
be arbitrary, and it must serve the constitutionally recognized goals of sentencing. 
On all counts, the case that s. 51(e) furthers lawful punishment objectives fails.29  
The minority believes that disenfranchisement as a punishment has already 
been tailored to fit the crime. Prisoners to whom the provision applies have 
been convicted of a serious criminal offence, and punishment — guided by the 
goals of denunciation, deterrence, rehabilitation and retribution — is intended 
to be morally educative for incarcerated serious criminal offenders. Because the 
provision only applies for as long as a person is incarcerated, it is individually 
tailored. It reflects the nature of the criminal offence and this is linked by the 
application of section 51(e) to serious criminal activity only. In this sense, one 
of the goals of disenfranchisement is rehabilitation. Prisoners will regain the 
exercise of the vote on their release from incarceration; this is an official 
recognition of a renewed connection with the community that was temporarily 
suspended during the time of imprisonment.30  
The next stage of the Oakes inquiry is whether the provision has a minimal 
impact on the right. The majority spends even less time on this part of the 
analysis. The provision is found to be too broad, catching those who conduct 
minor crimes and who cannot be said to have broken their ties to society. 
Defining serious offences by reference to the period of incarceration is found to 
be a tautology, and the legislation makes no correlation between the 
classification of serious versus minor offences and the entitlement to vote. The 
fact that voting rights are regained once a prison term is over is equally 
unpersuasive because it cannot be used to excuse the unconstitutional nature of 
the provision during its tenancy.31 Again the minority is not convinced. The 
denial of voting rights is based exclusively on the serious criminal activity of 
the offender, which is not tautologous. And the disenfranchisement only lasts as 
long as the period of incarceration, which is part and parcel of the fact of 
incarceration and thus tied to the seriousness of the offence. This makes the 
situation in Canada very different from that of some American states which 
disenfranchise ex-offenders beyond their period of incarceration.32  
At the last stage, the Court must look at the proportionate effects of the 
provision. The majority finds the negative effects of denying citizens the right 
to vote outweigh any benefits that might be found. Denying prisoners the right 
to vote imposes negative costs on prisoners and on the penal system. It is more 
likely to detrimentally affect the social development and rehabilitation of 
prisoners and undermine correctional policies of rehabilitation and integration. 
                                                                                                                                                              
29
  Id., at para. 52. 
30
  Id., at paras. 71, 120. 
31
  Id., at paras. 55-6. 
32
  Id., at para. 71. 
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In other words, denying a fundamental right to any citizen is extremely 
harmful. The situation is exacerbated in the case of Aboriginals, whose over-
representation in prisons reflects factors other than strict individual 
culpability.33 
Justice Gonthier argues, citing Dickson C.J. in Keegstra,34 that the 
government need not find the least intrusive way to infringe a Charter right. As 
section 51(e) only applies to serious offenders and only for the duration of the 
incarceration, it is not disproportionate or arbitrary. For him, Parliament was 
given permission to develop legislation after the Ontario Court of Appeal 
decided Sauvé (No. 1) and the Court should therefore show deference. “Line 
drawing, amongst a range of acceptable alternatives, is for Parliament.”35 
Finally, in assessing the proportionality of the measure, Gonthier J. returns to 
the nature of the right affected: 
If the objectives are taken to reflect a moral choice by Parliament which has great 
symbolic importance and effect and which are based on a reasonable social or 
political philosophy, then their resulting weight is great indeed. Over all, while the 
temporary disenfranchisement is clear, the salutary effects and objectives are … of 
greater countervailing weight.36 
Justice Gonthier accepts that it is difficult to demonstrate salutary effects 
because of the symbolic effect claimed by the Crown regarding 
disenfranchisement. In contrast, the negative effects — temporary loss of 
voting rights — only apply to the most serious offenders, and these may not 
even have any practical consequences due to the relative infrequency of 
elections. Finally, Gonthier J. notes that the provision does nothing to take 
away other political rights that prisoners have, such as rights to express 
themselves and act politically in other ways.37 
In the end, the decision proves that there is a fine line between complexity 
and complication. Although prisoners in Canada are now assured of the right to 
vote in at least federal elections (and it is highly unlikely now that 
disenfranchising prisoners at a provincial level is constitutional) it is evident 
that the Court is not the guiding light of hope and clarity that it should be. 
Instead, the Court is very much divided on how properly to apply the Charter, 
especially on the role that section 1 plays in analyzing government 
justifications. As Professor Weinrib notes, this rift in the Court is becoming 
                                                                                                                                                              
33
  Id., at paras. 58-60. 
34
  R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697. 
35
  Sauvé (No. 2), supra, note 25, at para. 174. 
36
  Id., at para. 178. 
37
  Id., at para. 185. 
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more severe as time goes on.38 Luckily, the case is also a fascinating study of 
other aspects of legal decision making. In the next section, I explore a number 
of ideas about Sauvé (No. 2) that make it — not in a pejorative way — a legal 
morass.  
II.  A SAUVÉ KALEIDOSCOPE 
1. Rhetoric and Dissension on the Bench 
Ms. McManus: The court decided that way, but I would not say that was the court’s 
view.39  
In Plato’s dialogue in Gorgias, the Sophists argue that rhetoric is the art of 
persuading people about matters of justice and injustice in the State. This form 
of classical rhetoric does not aim at goodness or truth, but only at short-term 
success. Subsequent to Plato, a long line of philosophers have revised the 
classical idea of rhetoric to include more than simple persuasion.40  
James Boyd White has argued that law is best seen as a branch of rhetoric 
because it is the art of establishing the probable.41 This view of rhetoric fits 
neatly within a modern conception of law — that the truth in most legal cases is 
never really known, but the institutions of law, including judging and the 
courts, are set up so as to derive the most probable outcome from a given set of 
facts. This model, however, normally focuses on the rhetorical battleground of 
the lawyers. The judicial decision itself is usually seen as separate and apart.42 
In Sauvé (No. 2), the Supreme Court arguably forgets its role in the theatre of 
rhetoric and enters the fray where short term persuasion is of paramount 
importance. 
Legal rhetoric is a struggle over meaning. There is always uncertainty in the 
law and this is especially true when it comes to interpreting fundamental texts 
such as a constitution. As White notes, the language of interpretation can either 
bring greater understanding to participants, or drive them further apart. When 
language helps aid community, it fulfills a positive role. As an example, he 
                                                                                                                                                              
38
  Weinrib, supra, note 5. 
39
  Special Committee on Electoral Reform, November 25, 1992. 
40
  Cicero’s Topica, Augustinians: see Crane, ed., Critics and Criticism: Ancient and Modern 
(Chicago, 1952). 
41
  See Heracles’ Bow: Essays on the Rhetoric and Poetics of the Law (1987). Also see 
White, “Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life” (1985) 52 U. 
Chicago Law Rev. 684. 
42
  White, “Law as Rhetoric,” supra, note 41, at 693. 
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cites Milton’s Paradise Lost where in the early stanzas Satan and the angels try 
unsuccessfully to establish a community in Hell. In its rhetorical style alone, 
Milton attempts to show how a community cannot be built upon the language 
of selfishness and hatred used in the poem.43 Sauvé (No. 2) is a dream case to 
use as a law school teaching tool because the Court seems similarly bent on 
exposing itself. I am not going to try and equate the language in Sauvé (No. 2) 
with that of Milton, but there are times when both the majority and minority 
speak in tones ill-befitting that of a shared community and thus do a disservice 
to the decision at hand.  
A basic rule of rhetoric is that speakers must use the language, in a broad 
sense, of their audience.44 Lawyers, for example, must be conversant in both the 
technical language of the law and everyday language. But to be successful, they 
should tailor their advocacy to the particular situation. In Sauvé (No. 2), it is not 
easy to tell exactly who the audience of each judgment is intended to be. The 
Chief Justice’s opinion, being the majority, should let the decision stand for 
itself, without personalizing it in any way. However, instead of referring to the 
respondent more correctly as the “Crown,” she uses the term “government” a 
hefty 26 times in her judgment. Of those, 19 times are in direct verb form, as in 
“the government argues…” or “the government advances …” This is much 
more personal than more generic counterparts such as the “executive” or the 
“Crown.” Sometimes the language describing the Crown is quite scathing: 
“Façade of rhetoric,”45 and “neither the record nor common sense supports the 
claim.”46 Is she deliberately attempting to hold the current Chretién government 
accountable? Is this use of language due to the fact that the Sauvé case has 
returned? Or is it just a sloppy use of language? Her language stands in stark 
contrast to the minority’s where Gonthier J. refers to the “Crown” a total of 26 
times and only uses the term “government” once. Other than this aberration, 
McLachlin C.J. tries to maintain the familiar judicial style of the majority by 
keeping above the fray and dealing with the arguments, not the parties 
themselves. She only refers to Gonthier J.’s decision once, in a minor remark 
about the use of deference.47  
Justice Gonthier, on the other hand, seems to consider his real audience to be 
the Chief Justice — not Richard Sauvé, the government, prisoners, or the public 
in general. He refers to her no fewer than 20 times, in a form similar to “the 
Chief Justice argues.” There is a very personal approach used here, not 
                                                                                                                                                              
43
  Id. at 694. 
44
  The first formulation of this is Aristotle’s Rhetoric, see Freese, Introduction to Aristotle’s 
The ‘Art’ of Rhetoric, Loeb Classical Library (London, 1926), at xx-xxv. 
45
  Sauvé (No. 2), supra, note 25, at para. 52. 
46
  Id., at para. 49. 
47
  Id., at para. 8. 
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frequently seen at the Supreme Court. Of course, it is in the nature of a dissent 
to respond to the argument of the majority, but there are a number of different 
ways of responding. In this case, it is as though Gonthier J. were a chastised 
schoolboy who finds the whole episode unfair.  
In traditional Anglo-Canadian jurisprudence, judges do their best to maintain 
decorum. Rarely, if ever, do they signal discontent with their fellow judges. 
The language used by both judges in this case, however, indicates a departure 
from this norm. Frequently, the two warring parties let their emotions get the 
better of them.  
On this point, both decisions begin appropriately, if not unremarkably. As 
befits the ultimate decision of the majority, McLachlin C.J.’s language is full of 
majesty. In her preliminary “essay,” largely found in paragraphs 6 through 19, 
she sounds less judge-like than statesperson-like, on the order of Abraham 
Lincoln or Winston Churchill. It is hard to convey tone in short extracts, but 
note some of the language in the following excerpts:  
The right of every citizen to vote … lies at the heart of Canadian democracy. … 
The right to vote, which lies at the heart of Canadian democracy, can only be 
trammeled for good reason. Here, the reasons offered do not suffice.48 
Charter rights are not a matter of privilege or merit, but a function of member-
ship in the Canadian polity that cannot lightly be cast aside. This is manifestly true 
of the right to vote, the cornerstone of democracy…49  
The core democratic rights of Canadians do not fall within a “range of accept-
able alternatives” among which Parliament may pick and choose at its discretion.50 
The idea that certain classes of people are not morally fit or morally worthy to 
vote and to participate in the law-making process is ancient and obsolete.51 
Justice Gonthier’s opening “essay” takes up paragraphs 65-134 of the 
judgment. It is an impressive exegesis, at times scholarly, at times practical, 
sweepingly historical and digressive. It is, however, much more plodding in its 
language than the majority’s. Again, a quote or two cannot fully capture the 
true spirit, but the following should be taken as illustrative: 
The flexible contextual approach to s. 1 of the Charter and the Oakes test neces-
sitates that this Court keep in mind first principles. The right to vote for all citizens 
is clearly encapsulated in s. 3 of the Charter and, by the terms of s. 1 …52 
                                                                                                                                                              
48
  Id., at para. 1. 
49
  Id., at para. 14. 
50
  Id., at para. 13. 
51
  Id., at para. 43. 
52
  Id., at para. 84. 
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The former approach, that accepted by the reasons of the Chief Justice, entails 
accepting a philosophy that preventing criminals from voting does damage to both 
society and the individual, and undermines prisoners’ inherent worth and dignity.53  
One aspect of the plodding approach is to drive home a point by repetition. 
In this vein, it is difficult to ignore the minority’s deliberate attempt to fix on 
the transient nature of the government’s limit. In his judgment of some 143 
paragraphs, Gonthier J. uses the word “temporary” 24 times, “temporarily” nine 
times, and refers to the “period of incarceration” or an equivalent about five 
times. In one paragraph alone, he refers to the concept four separate times: 
The reasons of the Chief Justice suggest that to be temporarily disenfranchised 
while incarcerated is to be severed from the body politic and silenced as an unwor-
thy outsider. Above, I explained how temporary disenfranchisement does not un-
dermine the “worth” or “dignity” of any offender but is instead focussed at criminal 
offences. I also have discussed how temporary disenfranchisement is to be seen as 
a dimension of punishment that is tailored towards rehabilitation and reintegration 
… [W]hile being temporarily disenfranchised is clearly a significant measure, 
which is part of the reason why it carries such great symbolic weight, it does not 
amount to the complete extinguishment of all means of political expression or par-
ticipation.54 
These differences in writing approaches of the minority and the majority are 
good examples of traditional rhetorical technique. The majority’s view, of the 
sanctity of the individual’s right over the State, assumes a kind of absolutist 
moral fervour. It uses language that sits well with this form of decision, 
appealing, almost religiously, to a moral sense of right and wrong. It is the 
language of grandeur. By contrast, the minority is not so concerned with 
objective truth. It is pragmatic and utilitarian. Government has come up with a 
reasonable response to a social and philosophical conundrum and the 
minority’s language acknowledges this sense of reasonableness. 
The use of rhetoric illustrates another aspect, however — the growing sense 
of discontent between the majority and minority judges. What is obviously 
becoming an extremely divisive ideological battle over the concept and scope 
of section 1 of the Charter is also taking place at the level of rhetoric. In subtle 
but disturbing ways, the judges are beginning to show signs of frustration and, 
sometimes anger, with each other’s views. 
It starts off for the majority in paragraph 8. Chief Justice McLachlin 
indicates Gonthier J.’s approach, and with a few deft uses of italics, creates the 
picture that the minority’s view is artificially created. As she notes: 
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  Id., at para. 93. 
54
  Id., at para. 85 (emphasis added). 
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My colleague Justice Gonthier proposes a deferential approach to infringement 
and justification. … He further argues that … we owe deference to Parliament be-
cause we are dealing with “philosophical, political and social considerations,” be-
cause of the abstract and symbolic nature of the government’s stated goals, and be-
because the law at issue represents a step in a dialogue between Parliament and the 
courts.55  
She then goes on: 
The core democratic rights of Canadians do not fall within a “range of accept-
able alternatives” among which Parliament may pick and choose at its discretion … 
This case is not merely a competition between competing social philosophies. … 
Public debate on an issue does not transform it into a matter of “social philoso-
phy,” shielding it from full judicial scrutiny. It is for the courts, unaffected by the 
shifting winds of public opinion and electoral interests, to safeguard the right to 
vote guaranteed by s. 3 of the Charter.56 
Later: 
… the fact that the challenged denial of the right to vote followed judicial rejection 
of an even more comprehensive denial, does not mean that the Court should defer 
to Parliament as part of a “dialogue.” Parliament must ensure that whatever law it 
passes, at whatever stage of the process, conforms to the Constitution. The healthy 
and important promotion of a dialogue between the legislature and the courts 
should not be debased …57 
Notice how, after the first example, the technique changes. Quotation marks 
can be used to attribute someone else’s remarks but they can also indicate 
ironic dismissal. Chief Justice McLachlin uses both these techniques. It is hard 
to resist the conclusion that she is indicating the unsoundness of the minority 
position.  
This technique becomes clearer when compared with the minority’s use of 
quotes. While the majority depersonalizes the use of quotations, Gonthier J. 
links his quotations directly to the majority’s opinion by express reference to 
the Chief Justice. This lessens the risk of the quoted words sounding disdainful 
or ironic. Here are three examples:  
The reasons of the Chief Justice express the view that the temporary disenfran-
chisement of serious criminal offenders necessarily undermines their inherent 
“worth” or “dignity.” I disagree.58  
and: 
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  Id., at para. 8. 
56
  Id., at para. 13. 
57
  Id., at para. 17. 
58
  Id., at para. 73. 
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The reasons of the Chief Justice apply something seemingly more onerous than 
the “justification” standard referred to just above. She describes the right to vote as 
a “core democratic right” and suggests that its exemption from the s. 33 override 
somehow raises the bar for the government in attempting to justify its restric-
tion ...59  
and: 
In her reasons, the Chief Justice claims at para. 16 that Parliament is relying on 
“lofty objectives,” and suggests at para. 23 that the presence of “symbolic and ab-
stract” objectives is problematic.60  
It is only where Gonthier J. is more overt in his displeasure that he achieves 
the same effect as McLachlin C.J. did through more subtle means. At paragraph 
159 he relies on a method of sarcastic quotation: “Further, it can hardly be seen 
as ‘novel’, as stated in the Chief Justice’s reasons, at para. 41.” Even here, 
however, he still credits McLachlin C.J. with the reference. 
Overall, however, the majority does try to remain apart from, and above, the 
minority’s decision. As noted, there is little attempt to personalize the minority 
— McLachlin C.J. only mentions Gonthier J. by name once and does not refer 
to any previous judgments rendered by him. There is nothing unusual about 
this; normal practice for a majority decision is to pay little attention to the 
dissent, except perhaps where it thinks it is being seriously mischaracterized. 
Instead, the focus is directed towards the government. 
Justice Gonthier relies on somewhat different techniques, but in the end he 
shows even greater frustration with the other side. It takes a little time for him 
to wind up, however. At first, Gonthier J. relies on the time-honoured use of 
respectful disagreement. His first paragraph states that he is in “respectful 
disagreement” with the Chief Justice.61 This is quickly followed by his noting 
that the disagreement is at a “fundamental level.”62 
The dispute then becomes much more personal. In the next paragraph, 
Gonthier J. sets up the battleground — the majority’s absolutism versus the 
minority’s deference. “She [Chief Justice McLachlin] subscribes to a 
philosophy … while I prefer deference…”63 A number of rhetorical techniques 
are then used, which together give an overall impression of deep concern over 
the direction the majority is taking. The first is to cast the minority in the role of 
David against the majority’s Goliath. This is done in two ways: (i) by quoting 
the Chief Justice a number of times from earlier decisions, not to show that she 
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  Id., at para. 95. 
60
  Id., at para. 100. 
61
  Id., at para. 66. 
62
  Id., at para. 67. 
63
  Id., at para. 68. 
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is contradicting herself, but almost as a way to build up her stature; and (ii) by 
giving the impression that the majority is forming a powerful and exclusive 
bloc. Justice Gonthier cites Chief Justice (or Justice) McLachlin six times from 
three previous cases in which section 1 of the Charter was argued: RJR-
MacDonald, Mills, and Provincial Electoral Boundaries.64 In contrast, he cites 
only two of his own decisions: Sharpe and Butler.65 Moreover, McLachlin C.J. 
relies on Arbour J.’s decision in Sauvé (No. 1) four times, whereas she does not 
cite any of the other prisoner voting cases;66 Justice Gonthier himself twice 
points to this earlier decision.67 There is little attempt to build up his own 
minority bloc by relying on judgments rendered by his colleagues L’Heureux-
Dubé, Bastarache, or Major JJ.68  
Once the opposition has been so characterized, the minority is forced to cut it 
down to size. This requires a degree of personalization that is rare at this level 
of court. Again, the language is subtle, as befits the decorum of the judicial 
arena, but not all that well hidden. A few examples should suffice. The first 
occurs about mid-way through Gonthier J.’s opening essay where he argues 
that the majority’s determination that the lack of the section 33 override for 
section 3 voting rights in the Charter alters the section 1 justificatory standard. 
To Gonthier J., this alteration is “problematic”69 and is “incorrect on a basic 
reading of section 1 which clearly does not constrain Parliament.”70 The use of 
terms such as “basic” and “clearly” are indicators of a rising sense of frustration 
with the members of the majority. He then accuses McLachlin C.J. of relying 
on “equally vague concepts”71 to those of the minority with which she earlier 
took issue. She is also found to be making statements that are “as symbolic, 
abstract and philosophical as the government’s claim...”72  
                                                                                                                                                              
64
  Id. The citations are made in Sauvé (No. 2), supra, note 25, at paras. 90, 107, 150, and 160 
(RJR-McDonald), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199; para. 86 (Mills, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668), and para. 78 (Provin-
cial Electoral Boundaries, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 158). 
65
  Id. Citations are found at paras. 11, 113 (Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452) and para. 182 
(Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45). 
66
  Id., at paras. 23, 35, 36 and 43. 
67
  Id., at para. 70. 
68
  Bastarache, L’Heureux-Dubé and Gonthier JJ. are referenced from R v. Sharpe, supra, 
note 65 (Sauvé (No. 2), at paras. 78, 82 and 182); Bastarache J. is cited from Thomson Newspapers 
Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 877 (Sauvé (No. 2), at para. 180) and 
L’Heureux-Dubé J. is cited from Haig v. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 995 (Sauvé (No. 2), at para. 
121).  
69
  Sauvé (No. 2), [2002] S.C.J. No. 66, at para. 95. 
70
  Id. (emphasis added). 
71
  Id., at para. 100. 
72
  Id., at para. 100. 
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Further along, Gonthier J. notes that McLachlin C.J. “apart from one 
philosopher, … provides no support for this contention; she simply replaces 
one reasonable position with another, dismissing the government’s position as 
‘unhelpful’.”73 The Chief Justice’s reasons are, moreover, not convincing, but 
simply “suggest” an answer,74 make “quite a leap” in logic75 or are 
“particularly inappropriate.”76 It all seems to bother Gonthier J., as does the 
way in which the majority characterizes his line of reasoning, so that he feels 
compelled to state that his view can “hardly be seen as ‘novel.’”77 Words such 
as “particularly” and “hardly” change the tone of the Gonthier J.’s decision. 
Read the same passages without those words and see how they differ.  
There is also some stinging sarcasm. In response to McLachlin C.J.’s 
statement that losing the right to vote impairs prisoners’ ability to reintegrate, 
Gonthier J. wryly states:  
I note as well, however, it is possible to argue that incarceration itself may make 
rehabilitation and reintegration more difficult, but it is still, in some cases, an 
important dimension of punishment and indeed a step towards rehabilitation.78  
Finally, as he ends his judgment, Gonthier J. drops the pretense of respect and 
simply states twice that he “disagrees” with the Chief Justice.79  
The Court should be above all this; as Edmund Burke said, manners are of 
more importance than laws. A question worth pondering is whether some of 
this antagonism is a result of the Chief Justice’s determination to bring 
harmony to the Court. One of the goals of the Chief Justice when she took over 
was to try to get the Court to speak generally with fewer voices, by reducing 
the number of concurring opinions, and also trying, where possible, to find 
unanimity. Statistics over the last few years bear this out. There have been far 
fewer concurring decisions during the McLachlin era than during the Lamer 
Court. To take some arbitrary examples: in 2000 and 2001, there were eight and 
nine judgments where concurring opinions were rendered whereas in 1995 
there were 31 concurring opinions rendered and in 1990, there were 44.80 This 
begs the question of whether it is possible to paper over differences in opinion 
so easily. Obviously, dissenting views will surface, and the Chief Justice is not 
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  Id., at para. 157. 
74
  Id., at para. 185. 
75
  Id., at para. 204. 
76
  Id., at para. 174 (emphasis added). 
77
  Id., at para. 159 (emphasis added). 
78
  Id., at para. 183. 
79
  Id., at paras. 158, 183. 
80
  I must thank again my research assistant, Jonathan Hood, who trolled through the S.C.R.s 
to determine these statistics. 
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so naïve to think that the Court can always be unanimous. The role of 
concurring opinions, however, is downplayed. One purpose served by allowing 
concurring opinions is to provide a forum for slightly different opinions to be 
voiced. These surely are cathartic. Enforced conciliation, on the other hand, can 
mask deeper divisions. So, when a case such as Sauvé (No. 2) arises, where 
there is no question that the Court is divided, it is possible that a much less 
respectful tone is adopted. It will bear close observation over the next few years 
to see if this unfortunate trend continues.81 
2. Renewed Dialogue 
Ms. McManus: The judgments don’t speak on what the legislation should be. There 
seems to be a common thread that runs through all the judgments. What they say 
most definitely is that they would like to speculate. They would like to rewrite, but 
they can’t and they won’t. It’s not their job to do so. All they can do is to speak on 
the validity of a section. 
Mr. Prud’homme: We will solve it for them…We may be helping the Supreme 
Court by passing a law right away, so they will see that it’s already been dealt with 
by Parliament…That’s my conclusion but others may differ. If we do that, there’s 
no more reason to go to the Supreme Court. They can have their fun there, but are 
we allowed?82 
The Supreme Court has been one of the biggest supporters of the notion of a 
Charter “dialogue” between the legislatures and the courts ever since the 1997 
article by Peter Hogg and Alison Bushell publicized the idea.83 Since that time 
the Court has specifically referred to the article in six different cases84 and the 
general concept of dialogue in eight.85 It now must be taken as accepted that the 
                                                                                                                                                              
81
  While one case does not make a trend, the Court has not been on friendly terms in other 
recent cases. A very good example is Lavoie v. Canada, [2002] S.C.J. No. 24, a 6-3 split, where 
even those agreeing in the result were in strong disagreement with each other in the approach of s. 
15 analysis and the language used was again sometimes lacking in subtlety. Also, in R. v. Hall, 
[2002] S.C.J. No. 65, Iacobucci J. in dissent, was quite scathing in his condemnation of the majority 
(McLachlin C.J.’s) arguments, portraying the decision as abdicating the role of guardian of the 
Constitution.  
82
  Special Committee on Electoral Reform, November 25, 1992. 
83
  Hogg and Bushell, “The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures” (1997) 35 
Osgoode Hall L.J. 75. 
84
  The cases in addition to Sauvé (No. 2) are: Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493, M. v. 
H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3, Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] 2 
S.C.R. 203, R. v. Mills [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668 and Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada 
(Minister of Justice), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1120. 
85
  The Court has lately been referring to a “dialogue” with Parliament without citing the 
Hogg/Bushell article, whereas the article was previously cited every time: see Bell ExpressVu 
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Court sees one of its functions as maintaining an ongoing Charter conversation 
with Parliament. This principle has infiltrated other levels of the court hierarchy 
— in making its way up to the Supreme Court, Linden J.A. at the Federal Court 
of Appeal noted that Sauvé (No. 2) was “another episode in the continuing 
dialogue between courts and legislatures.”86 Given this background, and the 
very nature of the relationship between the first and second Sauvé cases, it was 
inevitable that the dialogue metaphor would again be raised at the Supreme 
Court in Sauvé (No. 2). 
Both the minority and majority refer to dialogue. The minority does not see 
dialogue as implying some kind of absolute acceptance of Parliament’s 
response to the original problem. Justice Gonthier cites McLachlin C.J.’s 
admonition in RJR-MacDonald to the effect that dialogue does not relieve the 
government of its justificatory burden, as the Court must always fulfill its 
mandate to review. For the minority, however, the concept of dialogue means 
that when undertaking a section 1 analysis, the Court needs to be flexible and 
aware of the different requirements and demands placed on the government, 
especially where values of a philosophical and social nature are concerned. The 
very process that gave rise to Sauvé (No. 2) being in front of the Court means 
for Gonthier J. that dialogue is working. Referring to Iacobucci J.’s decision in 
Sauvé (No. 1), Gonthier J. declaims:  
[his] reasons seem to imply that, while Parliament’s complete ban of prisoner 
voting in the old provision was unconstitutional, Parliament was free to investigate 
where an appropriate line could be drawn. This is exactly what it was in the process 
of doing at the time the first Sauvé case was heard. It has drawn a line in the form 
of s. 51(e) of the Act.87 
This is an indication that dialogue is of utmost importance where 
fundamental values are at stake and choices between competing philosophies 
need to be made. In this vein, it is worth recalling the last words of Hogg and 
Bushell in their article:  
But, the decisions of the Court almost always leave room for a legislative response, 
and they usually get a legislative response. In the end, if the democratic will is 
there, the legislative objective will still be able to be accomplished… Judicial 
review … [is] the beginning of a dialogue as to how best to reconcile the 
                                                                                                                                                              
Limited Partnership v. R., [2002] S.C.J. No. 43 and R. v. Hall, [2002] S.C.J. No. 65, where in the 
latter both McLachlin C.J. for the majority (para. 43) and Iacobucci J. for the minority (paras. 123-
27) rely on the notion of dialogue to bolster their arguments. 
86
  Sauvé (No. 2), [2000] 2 F.C. 117 (C.A.), at para. 56. 
87
  Sauvé (No. 2), supra, note 69, at para. 161. 
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individualistic values of the Charter with the accomplishment of social and 
economic policies for the benefit of the community as a whole.88 
Justice Gonthier’s decision reflects this view completely. He believes that in 
its very structure the Charter sets up a value-determining mechanism via 
dialogue in which neither the courts nor Parliament have a monopoly.89 This 
dialogue is meant to continue until Parliament meets a full and rigorous section 
1 analysis and satisfies the Court that it has established a reasonable 
justification. But the last word is left with Parliament. Given the legislative 
changes, and the long line of cases litigated in various courts and at various 
levels, it would be difficult to contend that there had not been some 
rudimentary form of dialogue in this case.90  
For the Chief Justice, dialogue is also obviously a relevant point for 
discussion, given that the Crown argued that changes to the Act were made in 
response to Sauvé (No. 1). She reiterates the view that dialogue can be a good 
thing, referring to it as “healthy and important.”91 But the simple fact that 
dialogue has occurred does not warm her to the idea of slavishly following 
Parliament’s lead. For her, the bare fact of Parliament responding with new 
legislation does not guarantee constitutional success. The government’s attempt 
to meet the complaints leveled at it in 1992 is insufficient to save the legislation 
even though the provision is less restrictive than it was before. 
Both views are full of irony. For the minority it is ironic that their own 
understanding of the nature of dialogue belies actual events. In Sauvé (No. 1) 
the Supreme Court gave such little indication of what Parliament could do to 
rectify the law. One would think that if the metaphor of dialogue were accurate, 
a certain amount of give-and-take is required in order for the other actor to 
participate in a meaningful exchange. Never mind that Parliament was already 
working on new legislation before Sauvé (No. 1) reached the Supreme Court — 
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  Hogg and Bushell, supra, note 83, at 105. 
89
  Sauvé (No. 2), supra, note 69, at para. 104. 
90
  Justice Gonthier cites, as evidence of dialogue, the Lortie Commission Report and the fol-
lowing cases: Re Jolivet and The Queen (1983), 1 D.L.R. (4th) 604 (B.C.S.C.); Gould v. Canada 
(Attorney General), [1984] 2 S.C.R. 124; affg [1984] 1 F.C. 1133 (C.A.); revg [1984] 1 F.C. 1119 
(T.D.); Lévesque v. Canada (Attorney General), [1986] 2 F.C. 287 (T.D.); Badger v. Attorney 
General of Manitoba (1986), 30 D.L.R. (4th) 108 (Man. Q.B.); affd (1986), 32 D.L.R. (4th) 310 
(Man. C.A.); Badger v. Canada (Attorney General) (1988), 55 Man. R. (2d) 211 (Q.B.), revd 
(1988), 55 D.L.R. (4th) 177 (Man. C.A.); leave to appeal refused, [1989] 1 S.C.R. v; Sauvé v. 
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its very short decision did not even mention that fact as a reason for the brevity, 
instead relying on a reference to minimal impairment without elaboration.  
On the other hand, McLachlin C.J.’s view on the role of dialogue would be 
compelling if it were not for the disturbing precedents set in Mills92 and Hall.93 
In Mills, decided only four years ago, McLachlin C.J. accepted as 
constitutionally valid a legislative response that was vastly inferior to the 
response Parliament crafted in Sauvé (No. 2). Parliament in Mills had 
responded to a prior unfavourable ruling in O’Connor94 over the Criminal Code 
provisions dealing with access to complainants’ records in sexual assault cases 
by enacting “in your face” legislation — effectively legislation that mirrored 
the dissenting, not majority, decision in O’Connor. The Chief Justice in Mills 
showed great deference to this response, remarking that wherever possible, the 
Court should “presume that Parliament intended to enact constitutional 
legislation.”95 The irony is that in Mills, Parliament was given a good deal of 
guidance from the Court as to how to proceed. Nevertheless, when it proceeded 
in a manner opposed to that required by the Court, it was still rewarded:  
[I]t does not follow from the fact that a law passed by Parliament differs from a 
regime envisaged by the Court in the absence of a statutory scheme, that 
Parliament’s law is unconstitutional. Parliament may build on the Court’s decision, 
and develop a different scheme as long as it remains constitutional. Just as 
Parliament must respect the Court’s rulings, so the Court must respect Parliament’s 
determination that the judicial scheme can be improved.96 
Similarly, in Hall, McLachlin C.J. sees a legislative response as an 
“excellent example” of the use of dialogue.97 The reality was that the bail 
provisions were buried in a criminal law omnibus bill that had no debate in 
Parliament or in Committee. 
Compare these with the outcome in Sauvé (No. 2). Here the majority decides 
to forego dialogue in favour of a Dicksonian pledge to uphold the sanctity of 
the Charter above all else. Granted, it is true that in Mills Parliament was able 
to build upon a fully outlined argument that the Court had given it in 
O’Connor, unlike the black hole of Sauvé (No. 1) where the Court gave nothing 
for Parliament to go on. But is it still not a bit rich for the majority to refuse to 
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show any deference especially given that it was the Court’s lack of guidance 
that led Parliament to draft legislation along the lines of that found in section 
51(e) of the Act? One only needs to examine the Electoral Reform Commission 
debates to see how the members floundered in the dark over what to do with 
prisoner’s voting rights. 
If dialogue is to mean anything, the Court should, to the extent possible, 
expressly indicate whether Parliament is able to restrict prisoners’ voting rights 
or not. At the Federal Court, Trial Division, Wetston J. indicated that 
Parliament could meet the minimal impairment test by making 
disenfranchisement an aspect of individual sentencing, that is, by including 
disenfranchisement as a sentencing option in the Criminal Code. The majority 
at the Supreme Court refused to comment directly on this suggestion.  
What the Court did find, however, is that section 51(e) of the Act fails 
because it is not rationally connected to its objective. The Crown’s final 
argument under this section — that section 51(e) furthers legitimate 
punishment — is the one area that might be exploited. In a somewhat cryptic 
passage, McLachlin C.J. notes that:  
Section 51(e) imposes blanket punishment on all penitentiary inmates regardless 
of the particular crimes they committed, the harm they caused, or the normative 
character of their conduct. It is not individually tailored to the particular offender’s 
act. It does not, in short, meet the requirements of denunciatory, retributive pun-
ishment.98 
This may offer a small glimmer of hope that properly tailored legislation 
could be saved under section 1. It is unfortunate that the majority did not go as 
far as Wetston J. in the Federal Court in suggesting concrete approaches to the 
problem. Unlike in O’Connor, where Parliament was given a clear indication of 
what could be done (only to ignore it), Sauvé (No. 2) neither provides guidance 
for future dialogue, nor closes the door permanently on it. Of course this is not 
the ideal way to conduct a discussion. The lack of direction will almost 
certainly lead to another round of litigation if the federal government tries to 
tamper with prisoner voting rights again. 
Where does this leave the embattled metaphor of dialogue? At its best, 
dialogue is a useful way of illustrating how both courts and legislatures 
conceive their respective roles. It shows how the two institutions form part of a 
recursive process that in turn is part of a larger, more chaotic process of human 
decision-making. On this basis, we should embrace the Court’s lack of finality. 
Unpredictability in a complex and dynamic system makes it more robust and 
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flexible, and perhaps better able to maintain legitimacy.99 At its worst, however, 
“dialogue” simply seems to be another rhetorical tool wielded by judges to 
justify their own subjective views. Deconstructing the different dialogical 
approaches employed in Mills, Hall, and Sauvé leaves one bemused. In this 
sense, dialogue is no more than a convenient label.100 
As a postscript, it is interesting to note that dialogue is not just a metaphor 
that the courts now use, but government too is beholden to the idea. Following 
immediately on the Sauvé (No. 2) decision, press reports stated that Liberal 
House Leader Don Boudria claimed that the Supreme Court had not closed the 
door on Parliament drafting another response. The same reports quoted 
Canadian Alliance justice critic Vic Toews countering that the absence of the 
section 33 override in this case meant that the only alternative was 
constitutional amendment.101  
3. Media Representation and Public Perception 
Mr. Prudhomme: You are changing your own fine speech. If you don’t like [the 
cut-off number of years of incarceration before disenfranchisement] we will put 
more in. We can put nine. We might want to move five [years] in the House. They 
might come around to five in the House, so we’ll move seven here. 
…. 
Mr. Milliken: I think five might find wider acceptance, and I feel the issue ought to 
be dealt with there too. So that’s why I changed it to seven here... There are some 
biblical references to seven years. Wasn’t Noah in the ark for seven years or 
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something, or was it longer than that? Forty years, was it? I knew it was 40 days 
and 40 nights he sat on Ararat.102 
The sharp divide between majority and minority, and the seeming simplicity 
of the issue of prisoners’ voting rights, makes Sauvé (No. 2) a compelling case 
in which to examine the nature and interaction of public opinion, the Charter, 
and the Supreme Court. The academic literature on the Court and public 
opinion is favourable. A detailed survey by Fletcher and Howe has established 
that the Charter is widely known and respected by the vast majority of 
Canadians,103 most of whom would prefer courts to have the final say on the 
constitutionality of legislation because they have great trust in the judicial 
system.104 In other words, Canadians trust the Supreme Court to make better 
decisions than legislatures about rights. It would, indeed, be difficult to imagine 
a court deciding an issue in a manner comparable to that of the Committee on 
Electoral Reform quoted above.  
The Fletcher and Howe survey notes that it is important to obtain the 
opinions of a random selection of the population in order to get accurate data 
on public attitudes towards the courts. The editors contrast this more scientific 
approach with attempts to gauge opinion by noting media response. As the 
study makes clear, those who create the most noise are mistakenly taken to 
represent public opinion.105 What I propose to do in this segment, however, is to 
examine in detail how the media portrayed the Supreme Court in this particular 
case, and to draw some preliminary conclusions about the media representation 
of the Court. Although this approach is not intended to give an accurate 
representation of public opinion, it is an instructive exercise in itself. The media 
is a public voice that often shapes and controls the boundaries of a debate.  
It is no surprise that Sauvé (No. 2) generated its fair share of sensational 
newsprint. What might seem unexpected is the equally large number of 
reasonable responses. The headlines provide a first glimpse at the media’s 
reaction. Some are purely descriptive and neutral. For example: “Imprisoned 
Criminals Gain Right to Vote”;106 “Inmates Win Right to Vote”107 and 
“Prisoner Voting Ban Lifted.”108 Others signal some of the opposition to the 
decision: “Prisoners Voting Disgusts Some MPs”;109 “MPs Cool to Currying 
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Captive Voters”;110 “Victims’ Groups Angered by Ruling”;111 and “The Court 
Erred Mightily in Giving Lawbreakers the Vote.”112  
The main newspaper reports are surprisingly well-balanced. A piece in the 
Canadian Press cites a critic of the decision (Vic Toews, the Canadian Alliance 
Justice Critic) and one who was not against it (Don Boudria, Government 
House Leader).113 The Globe and Mail was also fair, giving equal time to Alan 
Manson (counsel for two of the prisoner groups in favour of the decision) and 
to Canadian Alliance MP Randy White and a number of victims rights groups, 
who were against the decision.114 Southam news service was also reasonably 
balanced overall, although papers used a very provocative opening line: “All 
federal inmates — including serial killers Paul Bernardo and child murderer 
Clifford Olson — have the right to cast ballots…”115 The pieces that were less 
pure “news” tended to allow dissenting views more print space. The Moncton 
Times and Transcript, for example, gave a forum to Charles Hubbard MP, who 
aired his strong stance against letting prisoners have the vote.116 The Toronto 
Star offered a parody of a new election: a campaign strategist tells a candidate 
that bringing back the death penalty may “hurt us with people at Millhaven and 
Collins Bay,” so the candidate decides to give out free DVD players to those 
who are convicted of a major crime.117 
Editorial content is probably the most revealing. Major newspaper editorials 
seem to reflect the same divergence of opinion as the Court. The Globe and 
Mail presented a strong editorial voice in favour of the majority decision, 
finding McLachlin C.J.’s vision of constitutional rights compelling: “Let us 
state our view upfront: we believe federal prisoners should have the right to 
vote.”118 The Vancouver Province was also on the side of the majority,119 as 
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was the Halifax Daily News, employing the headline, “Removing a Right 
creates a Wrong.”120 Under its “national” editorial policy, papers in the 
CanWest Global stable took the lead in defending the decision of the minority. 
The National Post and Vancouver Sun ran editorials that were strongly against 
the decision.121 The Calgary Herald was also vehemently against the ruling. It 
claimed that other democratic societies and Canadian opinion polls show 
overwhelming support for restricting prisoners’ voting rights, “[y]et the 
Supreme Court [has] its own theories about how best to treat prisoners.”122 It 
refers to the ruling as “meddlesome” and asks Ottawa to think about a 
constitutional amendment to reflect the views of the Gonthier J.’s minority.123 
Smaller presses were also more likely to be against the decision — two 
examples are the Niagara Falls Review (“Prisoners Don’t Deserve the Vote”)124 
and the Sudbury Star (“The Right to Vote: Canada’s Top Court Ruling that 
Criminals can Vote Demeans our Precious Electoral System”).125 
Some of the articles also pick up on the anger and open dissension at the 
Court. Kirk Makin notes that the ruling “sizzles with indignation,”126 and the 
Globe editorial euphemistically reports that the decision is replete with some 
“impressive philosophical jousting.”127 Another has the Chief Justice as being 
“scathing in her critique of the government’s case.”128  
It is in the contrasting language between those favouring the decision and 
those against it, however, where media representation of the Court is 
troublesome. Media siding with the minority decision are harsh in their 
criticism of the Court. The Court has “gone far beyond its mandate,” “ignores” 
much of the evidence from other countries and instead, in its “appalling 
decision,”129 “wades in with its own theories.”130 It has, in sum, “erred, and 
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erred mightily.”131 In contrast, those who side with the majority are much less 
glowing in their praise than the opponents are vitriolic in their condemnation. 
The media in favour of the decision are models of restraint. For example, in 
declaring themselves in favour of prisoner’s voting rights, the Globe and Mail 
refers to the decision as “difficult to appraise” and weakly concludes, “the court 
was right to stand up to Parliament.”132 
What is the end result? According to Fletcher and Howe, long term diffuse 
legitimacy of the Court remains intact regardless of the outcome of individual 
decisions. Despite this surface optimism, however, it is hard not to find some of 
the media reports unsettling. Although legitimacy of the Court is the paramount 
concern in a properly functioning legal system, there is more to the institution 
of the Court than its legitimacy. The Court is an august body: respectful, 
reasonable, and rational. In a way, it deserves reciprocity. At the very least it 
would help if those in favour of the Court’s decisions champion it. In Sauvé 
(No. 2) for example, none of the reports were bold enough to compliment the 
Court for its “courage” in rendering a “landmark decision” that “makes the 
right to vote unimpeachable in our society.” It may be that those in favour of 
the decision were only marginally in favour, whereas those opposed were 
vehemently opposed. But it is difficult to accept that a paper such as the Globe 
and Mail, which begins its editorial so powerfully, does not strongly believe in 
the Court’s decision. In the end, it seems that those who disagree with the 
Court’s controversial decisions cast it in a disproportionately negative light. It 
deserves better. 
It is difficult for the Court to remain apart from and outside of public 
opinion. The Court itself is recognizing the importance of public opinion and 
the media’s portrayal. In Vriend v. Alberta,133 Iacobucci J., on behalf of the 
majority, recognized that courts cannot remove themselves from society at 
large: “hardly a day goes by without some comment or criticism to the effect 
that under the Charter courts are wrongfully usurping the role of the 
legislatures.”134 In a very candid statement in R. v. Burlingham,135 L’Heureux 
Dubé J. warned her colleagues that they were out of step with public opinion.136 
And in a published interview, Bastarache J. clearly identified the links between 
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public scrutiny, public opinion and legitimacy, reiterating that it is essential that 
the Supreme Court not be out of step with the general public.137  
4. Through Thick and Thin: Montaigne, Walzer,  
and Moral Relativism 
Chairman Hawkes: [T]he testimony from Mr Kingley’s predecessor is that of all 
western democracies, our system of absentee balloting is the most regressive. In 
other words, it’s an administrative pattern denying the Charter of Rights…A better 
system of balloting…has been developed in all other western democracies… 
Mr. Prud’homme: If you eliminate western democracies, what the hell are we being 
compared with?138 
Meta-ethical relativism, as opposed to normative relativism, holds that moral 
truth and justifiability, if they exist, are relative to factors that are culturally and 
historically contingent. It can be contrasted with Thomistic absolutism or 
universality, which holds that there can only be one fundamental norm or 
truth.139 The Court in Sauvé (No. 2) appears to be torn between these two views. 
Michel de Montaigne, a philosopher who would have been useful to the 
minority in Sauvé (No. 2), was a moral relativist. To him, customary beliefs in 
any given society are functionally necessary for that society, and ipso facto, 
these beliefs are valid, at least for that society.140 The infinite variety of human 
practice and behaviour is enough to prove the point: “Each nation has many 
customs and practices which are not only unknown to another nation but 
barbarous and a cause of wonder.”141 
Relativism is not without its problems. Diversity in belief may be the result 
of varying degrees of wisdom, or it may be based on a limited perspective 
which is somehow distorted. There is no sure way of knowing. Part of the 
problem for the relativist is that moral judgments are not objective facts: there 
is no way of demonstrating their truth. For example, it is one thing to say that if 
half the world believed that the sun, moon, and planets revolved around the 
earth that this was proof of the lack of a single unique truth, quite another to say 
that there is only one right way to determine the voting franchise.142 
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Moreover, the existence of different ethical views does not prove a lack of 
objective truth or absolutism. Different views may not arise because of 
fundamental ethical differences, but by virtue of the fact that values are 
implemented in different ways in heterogeneous societies. On the other hand, 
one of the more dangerous effects of absolutism is the belief that no other way 
is pure or righteous. Montaigne gave the example of the Spanish who butchered 
North American Indians without remorse because they had “reasoned” that 
Indians were abnormal. He despised this form of inductive logic: 
Every man calls barbarous anything he is not accustomed to; we have no other 
criterion of truth or right-reason than the example and form of the opinions and 
customs of our own country. There we always find the perfect religion, the perfect 
polity, the most developed and perfect way of doing anything!143 
In order, therefore, to accommodate both relativist and absolutist concerns, 
Montaigne developed a more subtle ethical theory. Not an exaggerated form of 
moral relativism, where every form of morality is equally acceptable which 
therefore precludes determining any truth. For him, relativism meant that 
virtues are not to be based on place or nation — nationality and familiarity 
were not proper criteria by which to decide the good. A more reasonable, 
constrained moral relativism is one where morality can take a variety of forms, 
but is always bounded by the basic requirements for having morals in the first 
place.  
Another way to explain this in more contemporary terms is using Michael 
Walzer’s thick/thin version of morality.144 Thick morality is indigenous and 
unique, comprising a dense web of social and cultural norms. It is not easily 
transplanted from its origins. It has no necessary relation to objective truth, but 
it is valid and necessary in that it serves to make a community coherent and 
viable. Without these thick traditions, a given society would — at least to some 
extent — unravel. Thin morality, on the other hand, is universalizable. It 
transcends the tribe, the group and the nation. It is not some sort of overlay, 
grafted on top of the thick from outside. It is meant to apply to all human 
beings, qua humans. Its core is found in all thick societies, and can be teased 
out and applied more widely. Most articulations of human rights are broadly 
understood as thin in this way. But thick morality is not just an addition to the 
pre-existing thin morality. In Walzer’s terms, the local thick morality 
transforms the universal thin.145  
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This puts a modern gloss on Montaigne’s philosophy. If he were alive today, 
Montaigne would acknowledge the legitimacy of the thick as both constitutive 
of and essential to community. But because he also believed that virtues should 
be based on more than just place or nation, he would insist on Walzer’s thin 
morality as well. Thus, sampling a number of countries’ practices could make 
one reasonably confident that a correct ethical approach would be found within 
their parameters.  
In a way, the two judgments in Sauvé (No. 2) can be read as reflecting, 
respectively, Walzer/Montaigne’s relativistic and a Thomistic absolutist 
conception of morality. The majority is absolutist: persons are not to be treated 
as “means” and as such, every adult person, prisoners included, should have the 
right to vote in a democratic society. Individual rights, in effect, are paramount, 
despite the addition of a limitation section 1 in our Charter. The minority, in 
contrast, are relativists: the range of human good is too diverse to be 
determined in a single moral ideal. The minority’s moral stance is that the 
common good, expressed in the form of legislation temporarily prohibiting 
prisoners from voting, in which many other admirable countries participate, is 
an ethical one that should prevail. 
Chief Justice McLachlin has little time for arguments about the policies of 
other nations. The Court need only turn to the Charter to determine its answers. 
In her sole reference to other countries (described somewhat strangely as “self-
proclaimed democracies”) she simply states that their examples are unhelpful 
when trying to unearth what a Canadian vision of democracy is.146 
Justice Gonthier relies heavily on what other liberal democracies do; for him 
their practices are “highly relevant.”147 He sounds like Montaigne, as modified 
by Walzer: 
The examination of other liberal democracies simply demonstrates that there is a 
range of reasonable and rational balances that have been struck. The promotion of 
civic responsibility does not hinge on there being a single theory for liberal 
democracy. The lack of there being a unified political theory is, so to speak, the 
point of the overview. Reasonable and rational persons and legislatures disagree on 
the issue of prisoner disenfranchisement.148 
This is the kind of constrained relativism he first established in Butler,149 
whereby pluralist societies recognize that a number of different conceptions of 
the good do exist, but that there is an untouchable core of values or conduct, 
transgression of which reasonable minds will agree are reprehensible. For 
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  Sauvé (No. 2), [2002] S.C.J. No. 66, at para. 41. 
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  Id., at para. 142. 
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  Id., at para. 141 (emphasis in original). 
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384  Supreme Court Law Review (2003), 20 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
Job name: SCLR vol 20     CRA           Date:Tuesday, March 06, 2012 
Gonthier J. in Sauvé (No. 2), our collective disapproval is largely contained in 
the Criminal Code. He then works backwards from this to argue that because 
much of the Code contains infringements on rights, section 1 of the Charter 
must operate in the background to sanction these diverse and wide-ranging 
limitations on rights for inappropriate behaviour. Of course, if the Court is to be 
consistent then similar values not specifically addressed in the Code should be 
upheld by the Court as if they were. For Gonthier J., prisoners’ rights is a case 
in point.  
Relativism is the minority’s ethical flagbearer. As Gonthier J. states: “[t]he 
issue is therefore identifying what amounts to a fundamental enough 
conception of morality.”150 He builds an impressive array of statistics on 
prisoners’ voting rights in the U.S., Europe, and elsewhere. As might be 
imagined, there is as broad a range of legislative responses as there are 
countries. Most of the American states place harsher restrictions on prisoner 
voting than Canada. Eighteen European countries, including Macedonia, 
Slovenia, and Ukraine, have no form of electoral ban for incarcerated 
offenders. Greece has automatic disqualification for only the most serious 
offences — prisoners serving life sentences or indefinite sentences — leaving it 
to the discretion of the court for other offences. Other European countries have 
laws similar to the one set out in section 51(e) of the Act: Austria, Malta, and 
San Marino withhold the vote from all prisoners serving more than one year; 
Belgium disqualifies all offenders serving sentences of four months or more; 
Italy bases its decision on the crime committed and/or the sentence length; 
Norway ties prisoner voting rights to specific offences; and in France and 
Germany, the sentencing court can expressly provide for disenfranchisement. 
The harshest European countries are Armenia, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Luxembourg, Romania, Russia and the United Kingdom, all 
of whom have more or less complete bans for sentenced offenders. Finally, the 
minority compares our situation to that in Australia and New Zealand. Both 
restrict prisoner’s voting rights to some extent. In Australia, prisoners serving 
sentences of five years or more are disqualified from voting in federal elections. 
In New Zealand, prisoners in preventative detention, and those serving 
sentences for three years or more, may not vote. 
After reviewing individual country responses to voting rights, the minority 
concludes by noting that a number of international instruments allow 
restrictions on the right to vote amongst prisoners: the United Nations Human 
Rights Committee, for example, expressly allows disenfranchisement of 
criminal offenders in a comment on Article 25 of the ICCPR. 
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If you believe, as I do, in Montaigne’s and Walzer’s view of ethical 
relativism, Gonthier J.’s arguments are attractive. How else can we get a more 
rounded and complete understanding of morality than by comparison with 
others? Is it not a hallmark of wisdom that virtue can only be learned from 
someone else? As long as we understand the necessity for basic moral 
underpinning, then comparison with other countries should be very helpful. 
Indeed, even the very structure of the Charter makes a nod towards relativism 
when it is noted that rights are subject to reasonable limits. By putting that 
caveat first, we have given paramountcy to the idea that rights are not 
boundless.  
The majority, on the other hand, leaves little, if any, room for such notions. 
Moreover, some of the judges are seriously inconsistent. In United States of 
America v. Burns151 a unanimous Court spent a large portion of the judgment 
examining death penalty jurisprudence in a number of locations including 
Canada, the United States and, Europe. The Court did this to show how global 
abhorrence to the death penalty and wrongful convictions are both on the rise. 
To the entire Court, it was important to know what the rest of the world was 
doing and how others could affect its determination.152  
Is it important to look to other countries only when it suits one’s argument? 
It is hard not to see this as another example of results-oriented decision making. 
As far as prisoner’s rights go, when most other countries are much less certain 
about what is appropriate, it makes one wonder why the majority of our 
Supreme Court is so self-assured.153 
5. The Nature of Voting in the 21st Century 
Mr. Andre: The problem is this. We teach our kids in school…Certainly I was 
taught that the right to vote is something special we have in a democracy. It’s 
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  [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283. 
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  Id. The Court examines other jurisdictions mainly at paras. 79-93; 105-117 and 126-132. 
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opposed positions to Sauvé (No. 2) on the idea of relativism. Binnie J., speaking in dissent on 
behalf of McLachlin C.J., Major and Arbour JJ., accepts the wisdom of using the laws in other 
jurisdictions as an aid to interpreting Canadian legislation. Justice Bastarache, speaking on behalf 
of the majority of L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier, Iacobucci and LeBel JJ. only examines domestic 
legislation and sees no need to review laws of other countries. See Harvard College v. Canada 
(Commissioner of Patents), [2002] S.C.J. No. 77, especially at para. 13. 
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something responsible citizens do, and they care about their society and they 
exercise their franchise. 
…. 
Mr. Prud’homme: Are they ready to say that someone else could vote for a total 
mental case? That’s contrary to the principle of one person, one vote. Someone 
who votes for a mental person actually has two votes, because that mental person is 
in no position to express who they want to vote for.154 
While the final decision in Sauvé (No. 2) was obviously a great personal 
victory for Richard Sauvé (he was said to be jumping up and down with joy 
upon hearing the result)155 and for prisoners’ rights advocates, it is impossible 
not to read the case without thinking about broader issues related to the nature 
of democracy and voting in contemporary society. The final “probe” in this 
paper discusses the limitations of relying on litigation and the adversary 
system. By showcasing a very particular debate over voting rights, Sauvé (No. 
2) ends up partially deflecting attempts to revitalize broader public debate about 
voting and to make real changes to our democratic system to deal with more 
systemic voting problems. The lack of discussion about voter turnout in all of 
the Electoral Committee hearings bears this out. 
It is the nature of litigation to declare winners and losers. When this happens 
at a country’s highest appeal level, it is usually as if a competition has ended. 
The appeal judges themselves often view the appearance in court and the 
subsequent judgment as the final, if not only, chapter in the saga (although the 
“dialogue” metaphor is slowly changing this view). Lawyers and legal theorists 
show a similar tendency to overstate the importance of legal challenges and 
court decisions.156 In Sauvé (No. 2), this notion was also embodied in the media 
reports, which portrayed the decision as an “odyssey,”157 “capping Richard 
Sauvé’s 18 year battle”158 with prisoners’ voting rights. The decision handed 
down on October 31, 2002 was seen as a high point in a struggle for rights. 
Concentrating on the success and failure of legal cases, and equating that with 
the only struggle for rights, however, sometimes misses the point. Legal 
disputes tend to create the boundaries of a debate; more complex issues can 
sometimes be marginalized, at best, or ignored completely, at worst. 
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  Special Committee on Electoral Reform, March 15, 1993 and November 25, 1992. 
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  Reported by Rob Tripp in the Kingston Whig Standard — see “Federal Inmates Win Right 
to Vote: It Took 18 years for Kingston Lawyer to Make his Case,” November 1, 2002, at 1. 
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World (Open University Press, 1994), at 15-48. 
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The question of whether convicts should be entitled to vote is obviously 
important. And as a result of Sauvé (No. 2), there will be approximately 14,000 
more eligible voters in Canada at the next federal election. Of potentially more 
significant concern, however, is the drastic reduction in voter turnout in the last 
decade. Issues involving rights, focused as they are on Charter provisions and 
therefore more easily litigated, seem to disproportionately engage our attention. 
Broader concerns such as voter turnout may not get the notice they deserve. 
A few statistics will put the discussion in context.159 Voter participation in 
the November 2000 federal election declined for the third straight time. The 
number of registered voters who cast a ballot in that election was 12.86 million, 
which meant that approximately 8.25 million registered voters (39 per cent of 
registered voters), did not vote at all. This was the lowest ever recorded turnout 
in Canada. Given these numbers, it is estimated that only 55 per cent of 
Canada’s total voting age population turned out for the 2000 election. (The 
number compares favourably with the U.S., which has about 50 per cent total 
voter turnout, and for this reason is often described as the worst democracy in 
the world.) The downward trend is also mirrored in other democracies that do 
not have compulsory voting: Japan, the U.K., Ireland, Netherlands, and 
Portugal, for example, have all had extremely low voter turnouts for their last 
elections.  
A number of reasons have been cited for this low voter turnout in Canada in 
2000. First, the election was said to be devoid of important issues, and many 
felt the result was a foregone conclusion. Second, we moved to a permanent 
voters’ list, from our previous system of door-to-door enumeration. This 
change arguably removed some of the built-in incentives to vote that existed in 
Canada. Thirdly, there is a more generalized public apathy and scepticism. This 
is manifest in a number of ways:  
 
 changing times and changing values, such as declining church atten-
dance and lack of interest in party politics, have reduced civic commit-
ment. The result is an indifference to the entire process of voting; 
 changing attitudes towards authority and a heightened sense of personal 
autonomy are said to lessen the chances that people will follow tradition 
and vote; 
 a general political disaffection in today’s society. Surveys show that av-
erage trust in politicians has diminished while the political system in 
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general is less responsive to citizens’ concerns. Governing from the cen-
tre also tends to reduce citizen’s expectations in what MPs can do; and  
 the increasing importance of youth. Younger voters (18-30) are not 
showing up at the polls because they are less patient, more likely to see 
the issues of the day in global, rather than national terms and less inter-
ested in basic civics and political science. This erosion of state power 
and the concomitant rise in power of non-state actors (NGOs, interna-
tional organizations) and the perception of corruption and hypocrisy that 
leave a bad taste in voters’ mouths are all reflected in lower voter turn-
out. 
 
Voter malaise is symptomatic in Canada of dwindling civic literacy.160 
Democracy is stronger in communities that promote an ideal of high civic 
literacy because political participation rates are higher and interest in the 
operation of the government is more genuine and heartfelt. The relation 
between the two is mutually reinforcing. The dividends in these countries 
extend beyond citizen participation. Ultimately, policy decisions in robust 
democracies improve as a result of better input. As Professor Henry Milner 
states, only high civic-literacy societies, institutionally arranged so that a 
substantial majority of their citizens can count on meaningful maps to guide 
them through the complex decisions that their community faces, can hope to 
avoid large majorities of people paralyzed by inaction and unable to make their 
society better.161 
At the same time as voters turn away from the polls and traditional forms of 
participatory democracy fall out of favour, new fora come to fill the void. In 
Canada, one of these has been the courts which operate in a new rights-based 
environment. Both Sauvé cases can be seen as examples of people using the 
courts as a forum for a different kind of participation in the democratic process: 
a small band of dissatisfied prisoners petition for the right to vote in federal 
elections. Both cases are thus about one of the most fundamental of democratic 
acts. And both cases make a nice contrast with the doom and gloom of the 
political scientists who worry about the lack of civic literacy, and call for 
greater newspaper reading campaigns and improvement in adult and civics 
education throughout the school curriculum. It should be cause for celebration 
amongst those who fear further declines in participation in our civil society. 
That argument is fine as far as it goes, but there is a darker side to it. Sauvé 
(No. 2) places into stark relief one final reason for declining levels of civic 
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literacy — a belief that litigation is a legitimate pathway for determining the 
kind of community we wish to live in. The Charter has exacerbated this trend 
by making the Court a site for debating matters that would formerly have been 
debated elsewhere. I do not mean to downplay the gains made by some as a 
result of the Charter. The point being made is that these gains most likely come 
at some cost to the old-fashioned notion of what was meant by participation in 
a democratic community. 
Have the Charter and the Court contributed to voter disaffection because 
litigation is now seen as a better way to participate in real democratic change? 
A cynical view would be that the prisoners who participated in Sauvé (No. 1) 
and (No. 2) are not as interested in voting in the next election as they are in 
asserting a right to determine their right to vote.  
Obviously the Charter has created a massive new awareness of rights; it has 
also, less intentionally, created an industry of rights. Richard Sauvé’s case is 
little different from other individuals who have used the Charter for personal 
advantage. Championed by lawyers for prisoners’ rights who distrust the 
effectiveness of lobbying government on policy matters such as his, the cause 
gets framed into a legal issue, which must have a right answer and a wrong one, 
a winner and a loser. 
In the end, the result is not entirely satisfying. On the one hand, when 
comparing the Court with alternative venues, such as Parliamentary 
committees, it is impossible not to have a high degree of respect for the level of 
discussion at the Court. On the other hand, however, the Court’s purview is 
both necessarily restricted and overblown. The larger problem of declining 
voter turnout, for example, seems to be left unaddressed, perhaps because it is 
not able to be described in a way that can be framed as a Charter right, where 
an arbiter can decide an answer. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Next federal election, thanks to Richard Sauvé and the Chief Justice of our 
Supreme Court, there will be approximately 14,000 newly eligible voters. A 
common stereotype of prisoners holds that they have no time for authority 
figures, and are guided by their own moral code. If this is true, will they want to 
vote? Will voter cynicism and apathy among the general public be even more 
exaggerated among the prison population? 
Or, could it be treated as an opportunity for an educational lesson in civics? 
Chief Justice McLachlin held that voting is one way to educate citizens of their 
democratic responsibilities.162 Civic duty could thus be actively encouraged 
                                                                                                                                                              
162
  Sauvé (No. 2), [2002] S.C.J. No. 66, at para. 38. 
390  Supreme Court Law Review (2003), 20 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
Job name: SCLR vol 20     CRA           Date:Tuesday, March 06, 2012 
among prisoners. The government could make a big show of setting up voting 
booths in prisons and capitalizing on an opportunity to inculcate positive values 
in the rest of us regarding the importance of voting.  
Which will it be? Will the percentage of voter turnout decline even further 
because the new pool of voters have even less desire to engage in the basic act 
of citizenship? Or will this be the beginning of a rise in our voter turnout? Who 
knows? 
One thing is true. No matter whether you favour the majority or minority 
decision in Sauvé (No. 2), the government argument — that allowing prisoners 
to vote demeans and depreciates the electoral system — would be much more 
palatable if more Canadians exercised their “fundamental” right to vote. Our 50 
per cent voter turnout rate means a significant percentage of the population 
ignores the voting process. It makes one wonder whether the voting record of 
non-prisoner Canadians indicates a great deal less than McLachlin C.J. and the 
majority of the Supreme Court believe the right to vote is worth. Despite it all, 
however, the morass that is the great human invention called democracy, 
soldiers on.  
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